Tufts, and Piaget. From Baldwin (1902) came the conception of the stages (especially the description of the first two stages) and a theory that growth occurs through a process of continual small adjustments-"assimilations" and "accomodations"-which tend toward a state of homeostasis. From Hobhouse (1906) came the evolutionary doctrine that links societal evolution to moral progress. Mead (1934) provided the idea that increased capacity for taking the perspective of others ("role-taking") lies behind moral development. Dewey and Tufts (1908) proposed a three-tiered system of "pre-customary, customary, and reflective" levels of morality, which are directly analogous to Kohlberg's three levels-"preconventional, conventional, and principled"-to be described below. Finally, from Piaget (1932) came a theory of justice as social reciprocity and the method of the clinical interview. Hypothetical moral dilemmas, the heart of Kohlberg's method, represent an elaboration of the method of questioning which Piaget used with young children.
Kohlberg's theory is based on a system of six moral judgment stages, which are secondarily grouped into three levels. A summary of this system is presented in table 1. The preconventional level, which includes stages 1 and 2, is the level at which one would expect to find most children and some adults in any society. In contrast, the conventional and principled levels contain the four stages (stages 3 to 6) more likely to be seen in adults than in children. Although no statistical estimates exist for the frequency of the four upper stages in any adult population, even the United States, it is likely that stage 3 is most common, followed by stage 4, and that stages 5 and 6 are exceedingly infrequent except among highly educated, elite groups. In Kohlberg's view, moral judgment develops in an invariant order through the sequence of stages. That is, insofar as the child's moral reasoning changes, it is transformed from a lower stage to a higher stage-without skipping or bypassing any intermediate stages. A stage is a network of basic organizing principles for conducting moral thinking. Its structure provides a framework for all aspects of the person's moral reasoning. The judgments found at each stage are more complex and differentiated than at the stage before it; they involve what are not only logically but also intuitively more elaborate modes of decision making. Individual differences in moral development appear in the rate at which children progress 
I. Preconventional Level
At this level the child is responsive to cultural rules and labels of good and bad, right or wrong, but interprets these labels in terms of either the physical or the hedonistic consequences of action (punishment, reward, exchange of favors), or in terms of the physical power of those who enunciate the rules and labels. The level is divided into the following two stages:
Stage 1: The punishment and obedience orientation. The physical consequences of action determine its goodness or badness regardless of the human meaning or value of these consequences. Avoidance of punishment and unquestioning deference to power are valued in their own right, not in terms of respect for an underlying moral order supported by punishment and authority (the latter being stage 4).
Stage 2: The instrumental relativist orientation. Right action consists of what instrumentally satisfies one's own needs and occasionally the needs of others. Human relations are viewed in terms like those of the market place. Elements of fairness, of reciprocity, and of equal sharing are present, but they are always interpreted in a physical pragmatic way. Reciprocity is a matter of "you scratch my back and I'll scratch yours," not of loyalty, gratitude, or justice.
II. Conventional Level
At this level, maintaining the expectations of the individual's family, group, or nation is perceived as valuable in its own right, regardless of immediate and obvious consequences. The attitude is not only one of conformity to personal expectations and social order, but of loyalty to it, of actively maintaining, supporting, and justifying the order, and of identifying with the persons or group involved in it. At this level, there are the following two stages:
Stage 3: The interpersonal concordance or "good boy-nice girl" orientation.
Good behavior is what pleases or helps others and is approved by them. There is much conformity to stereotypical images of what is majority or "natural" behavior. Behavior is frequently judged by intention-"he means well" becomes important for the first time. One earns approval by being "nice."
Stage 4: The "law and order" orientation. There is orientation toward authority, fixed rules, and the maintenance of the social order. Right behavior consists of doing one's duty, showing respect for authority, and maintaining the given social order for it's own sake.
III. Postconventional, Autonomous, or Principled Level
At this level, there is a dear effort to define moral values and principles that have validity and application apart from the authority of the groups or persons holding these principles, and apart from the individual's own identification with these groups. This level again has two stages:
Stage 5. The social-contract legalistic orientation, generally with utilitarian overtones. Right action tends to be defined in terms of general individual rights, and standards that have been critically examined and agreed upon by the whole society. There is a clear awareness of the relativism of personal values and opinions and a corresponding emphasis upon procedural rules for reaching consensus. Aside from what is constitutionally and democratically agreed upon, the right is a matter of personal "values" and "opinion." The result is an emphasis upon the "legal point of view," but with an emphasis upon the possibility of changing law in terms of rational considerations of social utility (rather than fieezing it in terms of stage 4 "law and order'). Outside the legal realm, free agreement and contract is the binding element of obligation. This is the "official" morality of the American government and constitution.
Stage 6: The universal ethical principle orientation. Right is defined by the decision of conscience in accord with self-chosen ethical principles appealing to logical comprehensiveness, universality, and consistency. These principles are abstract and ethical (the Golden Rule, the categorical imperative); they are not concrete moral rules like the Ten Commandments. At heart, these are universal principles of justice, of the reciprocity and equality of human rights, and of respect for the dignity of human beings as Individual persons.
(From Kohlberg 1971:164-165) as well as in their terminal points of development; that is, not all children advance equally quickly or ultimately as far as others. Little is known about how much development may, or typically does, occur during the adult years of life.
A signal feature of Kohlberg's theory is his assertion that the system of stages is culturally universal (Kohlberg 1969 Kohlberg explains the lack of the higher stages in the peasant samples through what he calls "a mild doctrine of social evolutionism, such as was elaborated in the classic work of Hobhouse" (Kohlberg 1971:178). Thus, Kohlberg reintroduces the evolutionary doctrine previously discounted. In Kohlberg's view, all environments are not expected to promote the development of moral judgment equally. Rather, for different cultural settings, there will be different terminal points of development. In other words, the typical or modal child in some cultures will develop farther than the modal child in other cultures because their social environments affect their processes of growth somewhat differently. The critical variable that determines the terminal point for the children's development within a particular cultural setting is the "complexity" of its social and political organization (Kohlberg 1971 ). The more complex the institutional arrangements of a particular society, the more likely it is that higher stage subjects will be found within that society.
The critical idea here is that the end point of the development of moral judgment is related to a structural feature of the social environment, namely, the complexity of institutional arrangements. mental processes involved in moral judging might correspond to the requirements of social life in different parts of the world. This paper suggests reasons why the higher stages of moral judgment are not culturally universal. If certain moral decision modes are found only in the protocols of subjects from the developed countries or from urban areas in the developing countries, this suggests that such modes are relevant to problems salient in these "complex" social contexts but subordinate in other types of cultural settings. To be specific, the evidence suggests that stages 1 to 3 are definitely present among adults whose frame of reference is a traditional and isolated peasant village as well as among adults from more modern settings. In contrast, the cross-cultural research with adult subjects, including the findings reported below, indicates that reasoning that is characteristic of stages 4, 5, and 6 is limited to educated subjects whose frame of reference is a complex society such as a modern national state. If so, a boundary exists between stages 3 and 4. This boundary occurs, I would propose, because stage 3 is appropriate to the problems of social control and conflict resolution in a simple society, whereas stage 4 contains assumptions more suitable for the model of a complex society.
Because stage 4 seems to be the first higher moral stage that is definitely not culturally universal, this paper focuses on the differences between stages 3 and 4. Using interview data on subjects from both modernized and more traditional contexts in Kenya, the paper suggests how peoples' differing frames of reference are related to differing basic moral concepts. For the more modernized adults in this sample, the frame of reference is modern-day Kenya, the developing nation; for the more traditional adults, the frame of reference remains the local tribal community within Kenya. This distinction is shown to be empirically and theoretically related to use of stage 4 versus stage 3 moral reasoning.' 1. Abraham Edel (1968), a philosopher, has made a related suggestion that stages 5 and 6 may be culturally specific to constitutional democracies of the Western model. This hypothesis could be tested by interviewing adults from societies that are as complex as the Western industrial nations but are guided by different politicel and economic ideologies (e.g., the USSR or China) . Such a study would show whether the most sophisticated moral reasoning in the noncapitalist countries assumes the forms defined by Kohlberg as stages 5 and 6. In the absence of such evidence, this essay limits itself to the extended consideration of stages 3 and 4 and their relationships to social organization.
* ETHOS

METHOD
SAMPLES
Two samples are considered: first, a group of young men and women studying at the University of Nairobi; and second, a group of adults and secondary students from seven communities located in different parts of Kenya.
The university sample consists of 52 students (35 male, 17 female) whom I interviewed at the University of Nairobi. These students constitute an extremely heterogeneous sample in terms of ethnic group, age, family background, and major field of study at the university. The majority (35 subjects) were black Africans from all of the major tribes represented at the University of Nairobi, while the minority (17 subjects) were Asiatics of Indo-Pakistani descent. In general, the university subjects were slightly older than most United States college students since they ranged in age from 19 to 31, with a median of 22.2. They came from large families (median number of siblings, 6.1) and the majority of their parents had had little formal education (median number of years of education for mothers, 4.0, for fathers, 6.0). Most of their fathers (29) were subsistence farmers or manual laborers; others (23) were white-collar workers. In one important respect the subjects are outstanding members of their age group in Kenya. All of them have proved extremely successful at academic work, since only a tiny minority of students who enter secondary school are able to pass through the stepwise sequence of qualifying examinations that admit students to the university system. The university subjects were recruited in classes and through personal contacts. Possible subjects were informed that the purpose of the study was to understand their ideas of right and wrong by having them discuss some hypothetical moral dilemmas. Each subject received seven shillings for the interview (one U.S. dollar).
The second sample consists of 47 males and 14 females living in seven communities in the Central and Western Provinces of Kenya. These subjects belonged to five different ethnic groups-four African tribal groups (the Kikuyus, Merus, Kipsigis, and Luyias) and one Asian, or Indo-Pakistani, religious sect (the Ismailis). This sample is termed the community sample because of the method of data collection. Seven University of Nairobi students (4 male, 3 female) served as the staff of interviewers. The students, upper level majors in the social sciences, had been trained in the technique of moral judgment interviewing but were not taught Kohlberg's theory of stages (in order that their interview translations and transcriptions would not be biased). During the December school holidays, each of the student interviewers returned home and conducted interviews with subjects of his or her own ethnic group. The interviewer selected as subjects secondary school students (also home for vacation) and adults residing in his or her local area.2 Although the goal for each interviewer was ten subjects, in most cases shortage of time prevented full completion of this plan. The final community sample consisted of 25 secondary school students and 36 adults.
The adult subjects were all community leaders, that is, men and women who might be considered "moral leaders" in their locales. Those chosen had reputations as responsible citizens-persons noted for giving useful advice and counsel. Most of these subjects were officers or members of local civic organizations and church groups; a few were also holders of local political office. Because the interviewers worked in a variety of communities (ranging from the rather traditional rural location of Sigor in Western Province to the modern capital city of Nairobi) the subjects whom interviewers selected as community leaders varied from nonschooled peasant farmers to college-educated school teachers. Approximately half of the subjects were farmers or unskilled laborers while the rest held white collar jobs (teaching, office work, business management). Ages ranged from 23 to 75, with a median of 48. Their median years of formal education were 8.5. Twenty-five of the community leaders were male, 11 were female.
The secondary school subjects chosen from the same communities serve mainly as a kind of comparison group to the community Ieaders. These 25 subjects simply offer a sampling of the moral thought and values of the "new generation" in the communities. They were students whose homes were near the interviewers; they 2. The seven communities in which students interviewed were: (1) Githiga location, 25 miles from Nairobi (a community of Kikuyu speakers); (2) Meru Mwimbi location, 40 miles from Meru (a community of Kimeru speakers); (3) Sigor location, 50 miles from Kericho (a community of Kipsigis speakers); (4) Idakho location, 12 miles from Kakamega, and (5) North Wanga location, 50 miles from Kisumu (both communities of Baluyia speakers); (6) Nairobi, and (7) Kisumu (two cities in which Ismailis were interviewed).
were not selected on the basis of personal characteristics. Some attended prestige national boarding schools for top students from all over Kenya, while others attended schools in their local areas. They came fronm all six of the grades (or "forms") of secondary school, and they ranged in age from 17 to 27, with a median of 19.6. Because it was much easier for the interviewers to locate male than female secondary school students, most of the subjects were male (21 out of 25).
THE INTERVIEW
The moral judgment interview included four hypothetical moral dilemmas and a standard set of probing questions. 3. Thirty-one of the university subjects, as well as the entire community sample, were presented the full battery of stories 1 to 4. The remaining 21 university subjects received only two or three of the dilemmas. Statistical com-Interviews of subjects with some secondary level education were conducted in English. Interviews of subjects with six or fewer years of schooling were conducted in native languages and later translated into English by the university students who conducted the interviews.
SCORING AND RELIABILITY
Interviews were taped and later transcribed. The global method (Kohlberg 1972) was followed for scoring. Each subject's full interview protocol was considered as a whole and assigned the stage code (stages 1 to 6) most representative of the overall level of the subject's moral reasoning.4 Many subjects, however, could not be classified at one single stage because in one or more of the dilemmas they presented clear evidence of two adjacent stages, such as stages 2 and 3 (more than two adjacent stages were not seen in any subjects). These subjects were classified as intermediate and assigned a "mixed" score; for example, a 2(3) score ("major" stage of 2, "minor" stage of 3) indicated that the bulk of a subject's discussion lay at stage 2, with some secondary amount at stage 3.
Forty interviews (20 university, 20 community) were independently scored a second time. The Spearman rank-order correlations between the two scorers indicated satisfactory reliability (r. = 0.85 for the university subsample; r8 = 0.83 for the community subsample). In addition, percentage agreement between the two judges attained the levels of 95% and 90%0, respectively, for the two samples (here agreement, following Haan, Smith, and Black [1968] , has been defined as either agreement on the major stage designation or simple reversal of the major and minor stage designations).
parison of the latter group with the other university subjects, however, suggests that the variable number of dilemmas did not introduce systematic bias (either upward or downward) into the moral judgment coding.
4. To make these judgments, the Issue Scoring Manual (Kohlberg 1972) was used. This manual gives detailed descriptions of stages 1 to 6 modes of reasoning with respect to ten fundamental moral "issues" (such as property rights and punishment); these issues are defined or conceptualized in characteristically different ways at each moral judgment stage. Because all four moral dilemmas were designed to elicit ideas about the fundamental "issues," statements made by subjects could be compared with statements in the' scoring manual. The scorer, reading a subject's interview, recognized stage-typical modes of thought and judged into which of the six moral judgment stages a subject's interview could best be placed. For example, the scorer classified as stage 1 a subject who displayed virtually nothing but stage 1 arguments throughout his interview. Table 3 presents the distribution of the moral judgment scores for the university and community subjects. Frequencies of subjects receiving each of the different stage assignments are given. The subjects with "intermediate" or "mixed" scores are included in the mixed categories (e.g., subjects who were intermediate between stages 2 and 3 are included in the category Mixed 2-3). Table 3 shows that stage 4 reasoning is much more evident among the university subjects than the community leaders, although the leaders are on the average much older than the university students (and have therefore had more time to develop). Among the university students, 31%o of subjects show major or minor stage usage of stage 4 reasoning. In contrast, among the community leaders, only 1 1% of subjects display any stage 4 reasoning.
RESULTS
In contrast, stage 3 reasoning is as frequent among the community leaders as among the university students. The two groups are quite similar with respect to stage 3 usage, and contrast with the secondary subjects, who show much more stage 2 (and mixed stage 2) reasoning. This higher percentage of stage 2 in the secondary sample is not unexpected given the young age of the sample. Thus, the community leaders are differentiated from the secondary students with respect to stage 2 usage (a finding probably owing to development with age) and are differentiated from the university subjects with respect to stage 4 usage (a finding certainly not owing to an age factor).
If age is not a relevant dimension with which to explain the stage 4 usage difference between the community leaders and university students, the question arises as to what could explain it. The critical variable certainly cannot be lack of concern with moral questions by the community leaders since all of them were noted "moral leaders" in their communities. There are at least two conspicuous differences, however, between the university students on the one hand and the community leaders on the other hand which might play a role in the stage 3 versus 4 dimension. The university students have undergone much more formal education and are oriented much more thoroughly toward professional jobs in the modem sector of the Kenyan economy than are most of the community leaders. That these might be critical variables receives strong support from the brief personal sketches presented below of the four community leaders who do show stage 4 reasoning: Notice that both men and women, and members of three of the five ethnic groups, are included in this small group. Such diversity suggests that neither sex nor ethnic group are the important variables underlying the stage 3-stage 4 distinction. Rather, the personal sketches suggest that either higher education, professional occupational roles, or both, are more important. Such a suggestion receives support from the pattern of scores for the full community leaders group with respect to both education and occupation versus moral stage score. Table 4 presents the data for the full community leaders sample. The table displays the frequency of the moral stage scores with respect to subjects' level of education and type of occupation. Subjects were categorized as having "primary" level of education if they had attended one to eight years of primary school, they were categorized at the "secondary" level if they had attended one or more years of secondary school, and they were labeled "college" if they had attended some type of postsecondary institution (e.g., business college). The findings show that education and occupation relate positively to the moral judgment scores. Stage 4 reasoning is linked to college education and white collar occupation. Of course, education and occupation should not be thought of as independent factors-they are highly intercorrelated in the sample. Some of the community leaders can be considered highly "modemnized"-they attended Western-style schools for many years and they now occupy white collar jobs in the modem sector of the Kenyan economy. They either live in cities or serve as teachers for schools in the rural area. Others of the community leaders are much more "traditional"-they did not receive much, if -any, Westernstyle schooling and they live in the rural areas where they either own farms or do manual work. This latter group of individuals, however, should not be thought of as people at the bottom of the Kenyan social hierarchy. Within their own village communities they are quite eminent; they may be wealthy by local standards and they certainly wield power and influence. Within their own frame of reference (what might be called the "traditional" sector-of the Kenyan economy), they are "big men" and highly respected women.
DISCUSSION
The empirical findings suggest that stage 3 may be the highest of Kohlberg's moral judgment stages commonly found among "moral leaders" in Kenya whose frame of reference is the semitraditional, rural village community. Stage 3 may represent the mature moral perspective in this type of cultural setting, the face-to-face society.
In contrast, stage 4 modes are more frequently expressed by the new elite (the university students) whose education and goals make their frame of reference modern-day Kenya, the developing nation.
The trend of these findings is supported by three other crosscultural studies of adult groups. Research in Turkey ( A face-to-face society, such as a tribal group, and a state or national system differ in their institutions and processes of social control. E. Adamson Hoebel (1954) discusses this problem with reference to primitive versus civilized law. Hoebel states, "the more civilized man becomes, the greater is man's need for law, and the more law he creates" (1954:293). Simply to perform the functions of maintaining public order and resolving civil disputes, a state system requires more elaborate and formal legal institutions than does a tribal society.
At the level of tribal society, most disputes or "trouble cases" can be settled with justice and dispatch by conference between the disputants, aided by respected clan or tribal elders who mediate the case (Gluckman 1955 , Bohannan 1957 , Gulliver 1963 ). The mediators judge according to cultural norms that represent a flexible set of guidelines rather than a formal body of laws. The mediators' job involves more than simply weighing the evidence and deciding in favor of one side of the dispute or the other. The mediators must give justice where justice is due and at the same time create a workable compromise that will be tolerated by both parties. They must take care to reestablish harmony in the community as well as uphold the moral norms (Snell 1954 , Saltman 1971 Tables Set A) When the responsibility for controlling the individual shifts from the face-to-face community to the state, the sanctioning agents for wrongdoing change from being the people in the community to institutionalized legal authorities. This transition can be linked to differences between stages 3 and 4 concepts of punishment and of rules and laws. In the tribal setting, the problems created by interpersonal disputes bring local groups into conflict and threaten to tear the community apart (Hoebel 1954 ). Therefore, the task of the mediators of a trouble-case is to work out a solution that will restore good relations between the plaintiff and his supporters and the defendant and his supporters. For example, in traditional customary Kipsigis law, a homicide case was settled when the clan of the murderers paid blood money to the clan of the victim. If the killer had murdered several times and was considered incorrigible by his clan, he would be abandoned to the vengeance of the victim's relatives. For the national state system, the responsibility for punishing wrongdoers is vested not in the local community but in the state itself. Permanent institutions, in the form of police, courts, and prisons, exist to settle both the civil and criminal cases in the society. Hence it is a punishable offense for private groups to "take the law into their own hands" and seek their own vengeance. This distinction between tribal and state processes of conflict resolution is reflected in the stage 3 versus 4 concept of punishment:
Stage 3. The function of punishment is to reform the culprit, to strengthen his desire to be good, and to restore his relations to the victim by repayment and forgiveness. Tables Set A) A second feature of the state as opposed to the tribal society is the extreme heterogeneity of values of its citizens. As is clearly seen in Kenya today, urbanization throws together masses of people from different cultural backgrounds who disagree with each other on major as well as minor issues of morality. In a face-to-face community, where people tend to share many basic standards, it is reasonable to view wrongdoing as displeasing "the community." The moral individual does not want to offend the people among whom he has always lived and whose opinion he esteems. In the urban setting, however, standards are not even approximately shared and doing wrong cannot simply be a matter of offending "people's ideas." Instead, the moral individual might orient toward the imagined disapproval of people whose values he does accept. This audience could be somewhat abstract in constituency, as when a scientist thinks about "the community of science." Such a contrast is embodied in the distinction between the stage 3 and 4 conceptions of guilt and blame. Tables Set A) CONCLUSION The discussion has suggested why different modes of moral decision-making are appropriate for the tribal versus national frames of reference. In terms of Kohlberg's stage system of moral judgment, stage 3 is the type of thinking most suitable for a faceto-face community, while stage 4 is more suitable for the national state. Although stage 4 is considered more complex and differentiated than stage 3, it is not as a function of its greater cognitive difficulty that it is more likely to be absent among peasant villagers than urban dwellers. Rather, stage 4 incorporates notions of authority, punishment, rules and law, guilt and blame, and individual liberty which are directly relevant to conditions of life in the urban context. An urban existence-with its anonymity, impersonality, and heterogeneity-presents moral problems that are not met in the face-to-face community. New mechanisms of social control are developed in the transition from tribal to civilized society, and new modes of moral judging may evolve as a result of the same social forces. Modes of moral judgment should be viewed as adaptive structures developed by people to accomplish important cognitive tasks at hand. They should not be seen as "achievements" for which "higher" is necessarily better. Insofar as we come to understand what are the cognitive requirements of life in different kinds of social environments, we will learn along what dimensions the processes of thought may differ from culture to culture, or even from subculture to subculture within a pluralistic society such as our own.
